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Abstract 
The main aim of this article is to identify key external and internal factors that are 
capable of impacting and thus influencing directly or indirectly state performance in 
Southeast Asia with special emphasis on Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore. The 
theoretical aim is to develop a framework for partly being able to delineate some 
external boundaries for state manoeuvring and partly delineate the internal size of the 
space or ‘room’ that conditions state performance in an international cum national 
context respectively. On the basis of the above this article thus argues that the state is 
sandwiched between external and internal factors as the two respectively define the 
outer boundaries and internal size of the room in which the state has to perform. 
Key words: Glocalisation, State Performance, Civil Society, Southeast Asia, Myanmar, 
Vietnam, Singapore 
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Introduction 
The main aim of this article is to identify key external and internal factors that are 
capable of impacting and thus influencing directly or indirectly state performance in 
Southeast Asia with special emphasis on Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore. The 
theoretical aim is to develop a framework for partly being able to delineate some 
external boundaries for and partly the internal size of the space or ‘room’ that 
conditions state performance in an international cum national context respectively. 
Before being able to do that, however, it is important to conceptualise how to think 
economic globalisation and how such a perception relates to a given national and local 
societal level respectively. The conception forwarded here is the notion of glocalisation 
that acts as a key premise in that the global and local cannot be disentangled as the two 
mutually condition each other. This conception is graphically depicted as a triangular 
structure so as to illustrate the independency between the global, the national and the 
local. 
In order to identify the international or external factors affecting state performance the 
article further divides the global economy into developed markets, transitional and 
emerging markets, and ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BOP) exemplified by Singapore, 
Vietnam and Myanmar respectively. The reason for dividing the global economy in this 
manner is to analyse the way in which states operate in these different types of markets. 
The specific type of market thus provides the key signifiers for identifying the external 
‘room’ or set of constraints that states have to take into account when performing in an 
international context. 
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In identifying the internal factors affecting state performance an institution-based view 
is employed. It focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutions as well as 
between institutions and societal agents. According to this view strategy making on 
behalf of agents are the outcome of an exchange of preferences between institutions and 
agents. Institutions are thus not to be conceived of as a set of static structures. Rather, 
they are to be thought of as a kind of structuration of social and institutional interaction 
thus making the institutional setup dynamic.1 This negates the perception of the 
institutional frameworks as having a capability to dictate pre-defined adjustment paths 
for agents within the institutional setup. Accordingly, institutional frameworks may 
constrain but may also offer new possibilities for agents as these constraints also allow 
for new modes of learning that may go beyond the possibilities originally recognised. 
This creates tensions between the state and the institutional set-up in which the former 
is embedded. States are generally working towards institutional stability whereas the 
institutional set-up is in a constant state of flux due to the dynamic interaction between 
the institutional setup and societal agency. This schism allows us to identify the internal 
size of the ‘room’ for state performance. 
On the basis of the above this article thus argues that the state is sandwiched between 
external and internal factors as the two respectively define the outer boundaries and 
internal size of the room in which the state has to perform. 
                                                          
1
 According to Giddens, human agency and social structure are not two separate concepts or constructs, but 
are two ways of considering social action. According to him there is a duality of structures that on the one hand 
is composed of situated actors who undertake social action and interaction, and their knowledgeable activities 
in various situations. At the other hand there are also the rules, resources, and social relationships that are 
produced and reproduced in social interaction. Structuration thus means studying the ways in which social 
systems are produced and reproduced in social interaction. Basically Giddens defines structuration as ‘the 
structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure’ (Giddens 1989 pp. 25-
6, p. 376). 
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On state performance, institutional setup and societal agency in a global context 
As a first step in order to develop a theoretical framework for identifying key external 
and internal factors impacting on state performance in Southeast Asia it is important to 
probe into different modes of ‘reading’ the global economy. This constitutes the 
background for how to ‘think’ the state in such a context. To facilitate a discussion of 
how to frame state performance four scenarios are outlined in the following. 
1. De- and/or re-coupling from the global economy: Real Possibility or Intellectual 
Exercise? 
The first scenario takes its point of departure in the intellectual roots behind the notion 
of decoupling. The most important one is to be found in the so-called Dependency School 
that dominated the political economic discourses during the 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s. Its basic premise was that the world was divided into a centre and peripheral 
political and economic power structure, also identified as a First World and Third World 
dichotomy. The theoretical foundation behind this bifocal world view was mainly based 
on neo-Marxist approaches formulated by scholars such as Frank (1978), Banaji (1977), 
Amir (1974), Emmanuel (1972) and Wallerstein (1979). 
According to this school of thought the political and economic processes governing this 
world view had their origin in a Western initiated colonial and imperialist past that 
manifested itself in a global centre–periphery structure in which the centre, the West, 
monopolised and controlled global capital accumulation fuelled by resource extraction 
in the periphery, mainly, according to this discourse, from Latin America and Africa. 
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The link to the current discourse on decoupling was provided by Frank, who maintained 
that so-called Third World countries in the periphery should de-link from the First 
World, that is, the centre, for their economic development, as these links were harmful 
for the periphery. With fewer linkages to the centre, Third World countries could 
concentrate on domestic development and import substitution, all guided by a 
developmental state based on a revolutionary socialist ideology (Frank 1978). 
This theoretical macro perspective was later replaced by theories of globalisation in 
which multinational companies were the main players and nation–states acted as 
economic facilitators for domestic industrial internationalisation processes, 
developments that in particular have been discussed within international business 
theory by Porter (1990), Dunning and Lundan (2009), Shenkar (2004) and Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004), just to mention a few scholars in this rich school of thought. Up until 
2008, observers found supportive evidence for budding notions of decoupling, especially 
in Asian emerging markets. As such, Asian economies were perceived to be resistant to 
the contractions in the American and European economies due to their strong and 
constantly growing domestic markets, large currency reserves and prudent 
macroeconomic policies, partly based on experiences learnt during the 1997 financial 
crisis, and partly based on perceived modes of doing business compared to their 
Western counterparts.2 
During 2008 and 2009 cracks in the notion of decoupling began to emerge. The 
meltdown on Wall Street in 2008 sent shockwaves through the entire global financial 
system, not least in the Asian markets. 
                                                          
2
 For a more detailed discussion in this connection, see Gesteland (2005) and Nisbett et al. (2001). 
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Contrary to what those who believed in decoupling expected, the losses were even 
greater outside the USA, with the worst experienced in emerging markets and developed 
economies alike such as Germany and Japan.3 Even though China was relatively hard hit 
by the global economic contraction that followed the financial meltdown, it managed to 
engineer a decent rebound (together with India and a group of larger emerging 
economies in Asia), whereas the USA, Europe and Japan still remain on the verge of 
recession. In the first half of 2011 it seemed as if the global economy was approaching 
the second bottom of a seemingly ‘W–shaped’ (also called ‘double dip’) economic crisis. 
Taking into account the many fiscal stimulus packages introduced by states in 2009 and 
2010 to stabilise national economies around the globe, it seems at least for the time 
being that those in Asian economies have had the greatest impact on national 
economies, thus rejuvenating an otherwise rather battered discourse on regional or 
national modes of decoupling. However, the main question remains whether the current 
growth of the Asian economies as well as the many initiatives to various kind of 
regionalisation are signs of a budding decoupling from the global economy, and in 
particular, from Western economies via the differing free trade agreements including 
the latest initiative coming from China, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
A critical point when analysing these developments from a decoupling perspective is the 
relationship between decoupling and the underlying process of internationalisation of 
individual national economies. Even though a given national economy has been 
stimulated and facilitated by the state, this does not mean that the economy is becoming 
detached from the global economy. 
                                                          
3
 Conrad de Aenlle, ‘Decoupling: Theory vs. Reality’, The New York Times, 7 February 2008. 
7 
 
Evidence of continuing links between a national economy and the global economy can be 
seen in a national economy’s dependence on foreign direct investment (FDI) for its 
continued growth and through, for example, membership of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). In this way, the state is gradually aligning the development of its 
own economy with the global one.4  
It is, however, problematic to employ notions of decoupling, as global and local linkages 
remain strong and pervasive. It seems as if the discourse on decoupling is not aware of 
the current gradual dismantling of the historically conditioned Western economic 
hegemony, a condition that is being replaced by a more fluid, interdependent and 
contextualised economic world order based on shifting centres of capital accumulation. 
Decoupling or recoupling seem to be less economic in nature and more part of a 
politically inspired discourse in which the notions of decoupling or recoupling constitute 
potent political signifiers. Taking this stand on decoupling reduces it to a domestic 
policy manifestation that reflects a given position in an international landscape of 
multiple and shifting power centres, thereby unintentionally accepting an increasing 
global interdependency between and harmonisation of individual national economies 
(Rugman and Verbeke 2004). 
2. Towards a ‘Spiky’ or ‘Flat’ Perception of the Global Economy 
The second scenario takes a closer look at the current global political and economic 
landscape to identify the various opportunities and constraints that are impacting the 
economies in the Asian region. Based on a geo-economic understanding of the global 
economy, Friedman (2005) forwards the notion of a flat world, as a metaphor for seeing 
the world economy as an increasingly level playing field. This means that agents in the 
                                                          
4
 Conrad de Aenlle, ‘Decoupling: Theory vs. Reality’, The New York Times, 7 February 2008. 
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global marketplace have an equal opportunity in terms of doing business. Friedman base 
this presumption on what he has identified as ‘the ten flatteners’,5 which combined with 
the so-called steroids6 and the triple global convergence7  have all led towards greater 
global interdependency. According to Friedman, the net result of these developments 
has been a gradual alignment of doing business in the global marketplace in especially 
the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Furthermore, due to the so-called time–space compression (Harvey 1990: 240), that is, 
processes that merge or collapse the difference between time and space, inter- and 
intra-firm communication tends to be instantaneous. Accordingly, adaptation to local 
market and institutional conditions becomes an option and not a necessity for a global 
company.  
Richard Florida (2005) goes against the notion that the world is flat. On the contrary, 
according to him is it rather ‘spiky’.  He divides the world into three major categories 
that together make up the modern economic landscape: ‘spikes’, that is, major cities that 
generate innovations, economic production ‘hills’, and the ‘valleys’ in between the two. 
To illustrate this, he and some colleagues developed a map that shows geo-economically 
what a ‘spiky world’ would look like. The map illustrates economic activity estimated on 
the basis of light emissions. Many cities, however, despite their large populations barely 
register due to low levels of economic activity. 
                                                          
5
 Friedman’s ten flatteners are: harmonisation and integration, pushed forward by the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, Netscape, workflow software, outsourcing, offshoring, uploading, supply chaining, insourcing and in-
forming. 
6
 Defined as wireless, voice over Internet, and file sharing. 
7
 Defined as the convergence of the ten ‘flatteners’, horizontalisation of business practices, and economic 
liberalisation of emerging markets. 
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The ‘spikes’ or cities that are capable of generating technological innovations constitute 
the tallest peaks on this map and are rather permanent. They attract global talent and 
create new products and industries. The ‘economic hills’ are manufacturing centres that 
support the innovation engines found in the ‘spikes’. The hills can rise and fall quickly; 
they are prosperous but insecure in terms of investment. Finally, there are the ‘valleys’, 
which can be found in between the ‘spikes’ and ‘hills’. These are places or areas with 
little connection to the global economy and thus few immediate prospects for economic 
development. According to this geo-economic perspective, the world is not flat but 
constitutes a highly differentiated and interdependent landscape, if we are to believe 
these categorisations. 
Joseph Stiglitz concurred with Florida that the world is not flat and is thus also critical of 
the notion and consequences of the notion of time–space compression in this 
connection. In 2006 he wrote that: 
‘Friedman is right that there have been dramatic changes in the global 
economy, in the global landscape; in some directions, the world is much 
flatter than it has ever been, with those in various parts of the world being 
more connected than they have ever been, but the world is not flat […] Not 
only is the world not flat: in many ways it has been getting less flat’. (Stiglitz 
2006: 7) 
Interestingly, this discourse does not take the role of the state into account. It is more 
concerned with how to structure the global economy rather than pinpointing the 
importance of the individual elements such as the state and civil society that put 
together constitutes the meta-aggregated entity identified as the global economy. 
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3. Differentiated market perceptions of the global economy 
The third scenario further substantiate the notion of a spiky world presenting, however, 
a more advanced mode of showing that a differentiated, interdependent and indeed 
‘spiky’ economic landscape is closer to reality. This school of thought can be found in 
international business (IB) theory (Peng and Meyer 2011; Peng 2009; Ahlstrom and 
Bruton 2010). Besides showing that the various national economies are indeed 
interrelated and interdependent, theoretical approaches from this school of thought 
delineate various market types that are a direct reflection of the current forces defining 
the structure of the global economy. 
According to an IB approach the global economy can be divided into three main types of 
markets: developed markets, transitional and/or emerging markets and bottom-of-the-
pyramid (BOP) markets. The developed markets are those that contain the tallest 
‘spikes’. These markets can generally be found in what Fukuyama (1995) has called 
‘high-trust societies’. This refers to societies in which a high level of trust is placed in 
governmental institutions that provide for political accountability, checks and balances 
of the overall economy as well as judicial protection and security for social groupings 
and individuals within civil society. In other words, these markets are defined by rules 
and regulations and as such attract a vast number of international and domestic 
investors.8 Furthermore, the societies in which these markets are found can be 
characterised as exhibiting moderate growth rates and having stable political regimes. 
                                                          
8
 For a more detailed discussion of the role of institutions in various types of markets, see North (1991), Scott 
(2008). 
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The role of the state is deeply integrated in this scenario. For example, in developed 
markets the state can be defined according to two ideal types: liberal market economies 
(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs).9 In short, the role of the state in the 
LMEs can be characterised as minimal. This means that the state plays a minor role in 
regulating the market and ideally leaves the market to its own regulatory mechanisms 
with only minor interventions to stimulate the economy. In this category would be the 
US and UK markets, for example. This perception of this kind of markets changed rather 
dramatically during the height of the financial crisis. Here the state intervened to a great 
extent in the markets so as to facilitate an otherwise faltering economy. 
There are, however, heavy political costs associated with adopting such a kind of an 
interventionist state practice in an LME context. This could in particular be seen in the 
US, where Republican politicians were heavily attacking the Obama administration for 
being ‘socialist’ in its approach towards the current financial crisis, leading to a 
stalemate within the political establishment. In contrast, the role of the state in a CME 
can be categorised as Keynesian. Here the state plays a major role as an economic 
facilitator and regulator, a role that expands and contracts according to fluctuations in 
the market and the state of the economy. This kind of market is found mainly in 
Germany and Scandinavia. Both of these two ideal types of markets are within the 
developed market category.10 
                                                          
9
 For a full discussion of LMEs and CMEs, see Stephenson (2002). 
10
 For a further reading on varieties of capitalism, see Whitley (1998), Hall and Soskice (2001) and Carney, 
Gedajlovic and Yang (2009). 
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In transitional and/or emerging markets, one finds the ‘hills’. They generally can be 
characterised as quite volatile. Some of these markets are going through a period of 
transition from a planned economy towards an open market economy (for example, as 
Russia, China and Vietnam are currently doing), whereas emerging market nations such 
as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, together with the transitional economies, are based 
on more or less functioning formal rules and regulations due to the impact of localised 
mind-sets and traditional value systems emanating from the informal institutions. Other 
characteristics are high growth rates, very competitive low-cost manufacturing, high-
risk economies and more or less unstable political regimes. In general, the societies 
where one finds these types of markets can be defined as low-trust societies, to once 
again use Fukuyama’s (1995) term. This means that individuals do not trust official 
institutions due to corruption and non-transparent political and bureaucratic practices, 
leading to inefficient implementation of the rules and regulations emanating from the 
formal institutions. Instead they turn to informal networks based on family relations and 
other non-official organised-centred networks built on relational trust between, for 
example, business partners.11 In other words, contrary to formal institutions, informal 
institutions have a greater impact on the functionality of formal institutions, thus 
creating what Peng and Zhou (2005) have termed ‘institutional voids’ that are dealt with 
by network practices, which are to make up for the different institutional voids. 
In terms of market characteristics, a transitional and/or emerging market can be 
positioned somewhere between an LME and a CME. 
                                                          
11
 For a further discussion of the notion of trust, see Fukuyama (1995). 
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This means that the role and involvement of the state in the economy is relatively high. 
The literature on the state in these kinds of markets refers to the state as either an 
interventionist state or a developmental state that to a great extent is involved in the 
economy and thus also in overall national industrial development (see for example 
Hutchinson 2009 and Beh 2007). Although variations of the developmental type of state 
can also be found in developed markets, it is mainly related to transitional and/or 
emerging markets, where market structures are relatively weak and unregulated thus 
producing vulnerable industries that are easy prey for global competition. These kinds 
of markets can be found in former Eastern Europe and Russia, Latin America, Africa, 
India and most of Asia except Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The final category of markets in this context is the so-called ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
(BOP) type of markets. They constitute the ‘valleys’, when employing Florida’s typology. 
They can be characterised by an absence of formal institutions, that is, of very few or no 
formal rules and regulations to guide either local or international companies doing 
business there. Here, informal rules can be understood as mainly socially sanctioned 
norms of behaviour that are embedded in cultural and religious practices as well as in 
local value systems. These markets are found mainly in rural areas, urban slums and 
shanty towns. People living in BOP markets have few assets, little or no education, are 
outside of conventional distribution, credit and communication networks, and they 
subsist on less than US$4 a day (Peng 2009: 6). BOP markets are scattered throughout 
the world, mostly in countries outside the West, for example, in parts of Latin America, 
Africa, India, China and Southeast Asia. 
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One of the interesting things about BOP markets is that they have the potential to 
develop into emerging markets should the government invest in infrastructure, thus 
preparing the ground for companies other than MNCs to tap into these markets. The 
companies behind this kind of development are often successful pioneers, who first 
established themselves in these difficult markets. Two such pioneers are Unilever 
Hindustan, which operates successfully in the Indian BOP market12 and the Danish 
company Fan Milk International A/S that operates in several African countries.13 
4. Towards a Glocalised Economy 
The fourth and final scenario is represented by Roland Robertson, who is credited with 
popularising the term, ‘glocalisation’ that describes the effects of local conditions on 
global impacts on local conditionalities (Robertson 1995: 25-44). Ferguson and 
Mansbach further elaborate on the concept saying that the notion of glocalisation 
signifies the existence of complex ‘parallel, irreversible and mutually interdependent 
processes by which globalisation-deepens-localisation-deepens-globalisation and so on’ 
(Ferguson and Mansbach 2012: 138). The global and the local are thus inextricably and 
irreversibly bound together through a dynamic relationship with huge flows of 
resources moving forwards and backwards between the two. Neither the global nor the 
local can exists without the other.14 
                                                          
12
 For a pertinent case study in this connection see 'Realities of Emerging Markets: Some Lessons from 
Unilever's Strategy for Lifebuoy & Sunsilk in India'. 
(http://www.icmrindia.org/casestudies/catalogue/Marketing1/MKTA008.htm ) | Case Studies Collection) 
(2008). 
13
 http://www.fanmilk.com/index.php?id=85. Accessed on Sept. 17, 2013.  
14
 For a case study on glocalisation, see Jain et al. 2012. 
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The key issue here is what has been termed the global–local nexus, or to use a more 
popular phrase, ‘think globally, act locally’. The different types of markets, whether spiky 
or flat, whether you can decouple from the global economy or not, are all governed by 
the global–local nexus, that is, the global impact on the local and vice versa. As it is the 
interface between the two that determines the success rate at either the global or the 
local level, we must take a closer look at this interface to understand what it consists of 
as well as identify the drivers behind the nexus. Basically, it is this interface that 
constitutes the complex reality ‘out there’ that we have to deal with in our everyday life. 
As glocalisation not only deals with global and local economic matters but encompasses 
all aspects of the local in the global, it is important to look at the main players in this 
context. They can be organised in a triangular matrix. The individual points in this 
matrix consist of 1) global political and economic developments, 2) the role of the state, 
and 3) civil society. By analysing the relationships among these three main players it 
becomes possible to identify the drivers behind glocalisation. When employing such an 
approach, the intricate interdependency between a given region (in this particular case, 
Southeast Asia), particular nations (Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore) and specific 
localities within each of these nations clearly comes forth. 
The following discussion zooms in on the performance of the state by employing the 
notion of glocalisation. This perspective amounts to a holistic approach of analysing 
state performance in the triangle, as we recognise that the three other scenarios’ of how 
to ‘read’ the global economy;  
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the possibility of de- or recouple from it, whether it is spiky or flat or whether a 
qualitative market differentiation of it is possible—only address two of the three 
corners in the triangle, namely the global political and economic developments and the 
role of the state nationally as well as internationally. On the basis of this we will begin 
our discussion by looking closer at the way in which the state performs in relation to the 
different corners in the triangle so as to identify how different sets of external and 
internal constraints either confines or enlarge the ‘room’ in which the state is capable of 
performing. 
Closing in on the external and internal factors affecting state performance 
In identifying the external factors affecting state performance a point of departure is 
taken in the global economy divided into the three main types of markets as discussed in 
relation to IB theory and how that relate to state performance. In the context of this 
article this means that developed markets are represented by Singapore, transitional 
and emerging markets are represented by Vietnam, and a combination of emerging and 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BOP) markets are represented by Myanmar. As the individual 
type of market puts certain constrains on state performance in the three case countries 
it is expected that we will be able to excavate the boundaries within which the state in 
these three country specific types of markets is capable of operating. Arguably, the 
different characteristics and types of market thus produce the main signifiers for 
identifying the external constraints that conditions the outer boundaries for the ‘room’ 
in which states are to perform. 
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In order to identify the internal factors affecting state performance a point of departure 
is taken in the role of the state as well as in the respective civil society. To initiate this 
discussion an institution-based approach of the three case studies is employed. It 
focuses on the dynamic interaction between the formal and informal societal institutions 
and between the societal institutions and human agency emanating from socio-political 
forces within the civil society. According to this strategy making on behalf of agents are 
the outcome of changing preferences governing the relationship between institutions 
and agents. Institutions are thus not to be perceived as static sets of structures issuing 
specific sets of rules after which agents are to react. Rather, we are talking about a 
delineation of the dynamic relationship between societal agency and the institutional 
setup. 
 
Applying the triangular approach to Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore 
Presumption I 
According to a 2013 OECD report the economic outlook for Southeast Asia remains 
robust over the medium term secured by a steady rise in domestic demand. In 
particular, real GDP growth in the region will remain robust in the medium term, 
growing at a pace which is comparable to the pre-global financial crisis period. Growth 
in domestic demand, particularly private consumption and investment, will be the main 
driver of growth in most countries as well as current account surpluses will remain 
relatively stable as shares of GDP in the region. 
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Growth will be less reliant on net exports than in the past. In the near term, while 
downside risks to growth remain in the form of financial volatility and capital flows, 
Southeast Asian economies will weather these as the underlying fundamentals remain 
resilient (OECD 2013).15 
Despite these positive forecasts the Southeast Asian economies face important policy 
challenges in realising their medium-term growth potential. Capital mobility is a key 
component of international finance and the management of risks arising from 
fluctuating capital inflows will continue to be a key challenge. The scope for using capital 
controls to deal with surges in capital inflow will gradually become more limited as the 
Southeast Asian countries further liberalise their capital accounts. More importantly, 
implementation of structural policy reforms in areas such as financial and product 
market regulation will be the key to maximising the long-term benefits of capital flows 
and minimising their associated risks. In addition, to sustain robust real economic 
growth in the region, structural policy changes will be needed to narrow development 
gaps and enhance regional integration. These regional integration efforts have reached a 
critical stage and their expected progress over the next several years is a positive factor 
in the favourable medium-term outlook for Southeast Asia (ibid 2013). 
In the following three case studies, covering Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore, will 
briefly be discussed in relation to the international political developments and how they 
impact on the state ability to perform within each case country.16 
 
                                                          
15
 Economic outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the Middle-Income Trap. OECD 2013. 
16
 The following data on each case country is taken from country reports, Economist Intelligence Units Limited 
2014. 
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Myanmar - an emerging/BOP market: an external view 
The current government will continue to pursue a policy of re-engagement with the 
West. Many Western countries, including the US, have suspended most of their sanctions 
against Myanmar and the EU lifted almost all sanctions in April 2013. However, 
Myanmar’s relations with Western governments, Islamic countries and international 
organisations will remain under strain because of the administration’s poor handling of 
sectarian violence. The US renewed its remaining sanctions against Myanmar in May 
2014, citing ongoing human rights abuses and conflict. The conduct and result of the 
2015 general election will have a major impact on Myanmar's relations with the West. A 
free and fair election preceded by constitutional liberalisation would accelerate Western 
engagement. Conversely, the US and EU have already hinted that failure to allow Aung 
San Suu Kyi to become president following the poll would undermine its legitimacy. 
Western governments have also cited progress towards ethnic reconciliation as a key 
requirement of closer ties. Improving overall ties with the US could, however, create 
strains in the government's relations with China—the strongest backer of the military 
junta that ruled Myanmar until 2010. Ties with China will also be complicated by the 
greater political openness in Myanmar, which has led to popular protests against 
Chinese-invested mining and energy projects. Although China will remain an important 
trade and investment partner, Myanmar will continue to build closer ties with Japan and 
India in an effort to reduce its reliance on China. 
 
 
20 
 
Vietnam - an emerging/transitional market: an external view 
Vietnam will make further strides in strengthening its ties with the West. A series of 
high-level exchanges has bolstered US-Vietnamese diplomatic relations, while military 
ties are also strengthening. 
There are strong indications that the US will lift its ban on arms sales to Vietnam within 
the next couple of years. The economic relationship between the two will also continue 
to develop, especially if, as The Economist Intelligence Unit expects, both sign the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), an inter-regional free-trade agreement, during the forecast 
period. China’s decision in May 2014 to drill for fossil fuels in waters claimed by 
Vietnam, and violent anti-China riots that followed in the latter, have brought bilateral 
relations to their lowest point since China’s invasion of northern Vietnam in 1979. 
Bilateral relations between the two will be characterised by growing distrust in the 
coming years. Increasingly strained relations with China probably mean that Vietnam 
continues to pursue closer ties with the US, including broader military co-operation. 
Along with the Philippines, Vietnam will furthermore continue to spearhead efforts by 
ASEAN to push for a legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea. 
Singapore - a near developed market: an external view 
Relations with Malaysia have warmed in recent years, partly owing to the substantial 
opportunities for economic co-operation in the Iskandar development zone in the 
southern Malaysian state Johor. Greater connectivity will promote economic integration, 
bringing together Singapore’s investment and capital and Malaysia’s land, cheap labour 
and other natural resources. 
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Singapore will maintain its role at the forefront of efforts to improve cooperation and 
integration among the ten members of ASEAN. The city state’s diplomatic initiatives 
with China are partly motivated by the lure of greater Chinese investment. 
More broadly, Singapore is keen to foster closer economic ties between China and 
ASEAN. However, the government will remain mindful that regional tensions resulting 
from territorial disputes in the South China Sea could hurt Singapore's trade dependent 
economy. This will ensure that the country takes an active diplomatic role to emphasise 
the need for calm, while maintaining its neutral foreign policy stance. 
Singapore’s policymakers will continue to keep a close eye on economic developments 
in the EU and US. Singapore is among the countries in South-east Asia that are most 
vulnerable to low levels of demand in Western economies. Nevertheless, closer trade 
relations with China and Malaysia in recent years would provide some buffer in the 
event of a sharp slowdown in the West. 
Sub-conclusion on Presumption I 
As mentioned earlier when identifying the external factors affecting state performance a 
point of departure has been taken in two of the three corners of the triangular matrix, 
namely the global economy divided into the three main types of markets as discussed in 
IB theory, and the role of the state in each of these markets. On the basis of this the 
expectation in the previous section was that we would be able to excavate the main 
signifiers for identifying the external constraints that conditions the ‘room’ in which 
states are to perform. 
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As has been shown in the discussion of the external constraints on state performance in 
Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore all three countries are integrated into the global 
economy although the actual way in which this is done for the individual case country 
varies considerably. 
Myanmar, in trying to restructure its institutional setup and fragmented economic 
infrastructure, is pursuing a reengagement with the West in order to safeguard its 
reform programme, but by doing this it strains the relation with its old partner China. As 
a consequence the state gets entangled in an international power play between the 
West, China, Japan and India that complicates its ability to navigate its international 
friends and foes. As China, although important for Myanmar as it is, is gradually being 
cornered by the three other actors in this power game this forces the Myanmamese state 
to pursue additional measures to further processes of democratisation and economic 
liberalisation beyond what it had originally in mind if it is to maintain it good relation 
with them. The Myanmarmese state thus has to balance carefully between the various 
opportunities and constraints emanating from the international community as well as to 
come up with a solution to maintaining national political and ethnic coherence in order 
to be able to stay in power. In a sense the external boundaries of the room in which the 
state is to manoeuvre is in this case relatively narrow. 
Vietnam is also court up in an international power play. It is entangled in a close 
collaboration with the US and the ASEAN countries in order to bolster growing negative 
relations with China 
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 Again, the Vietnamese state’s room for manoeuvring internationally as well as 
nationally is rather curtailed by its political and economic dependency on the external 
players in the region. This can be seen in Vietnam’s advancing transition from a 
command economy towards a more open market economy where institutional voids are 
expected to diminish as the country moves up the global value chain. 
The crucial question to ask here is, however, how well the state manages its Western 
dominated opening up policy internally, as that is closely being scrutinised by its 
international partners thus conditioning the expansion or contraction of the external 
boundaries for state performance. 
Singapore is perhaps the most active Southeast Asian country on the international scene 
due to its fundamental dependency on maintaining positive economic and political 
relations with not only the other ASEAN countries, but also the global economic 
community per se, in particular the US and EU, - a dependency that the state manage 
very skilfully thus constantly expanding the boundaries of the room in which it can act. 
This allows the state to remain an active international player thus reinforcing further 
collaboration and integration of the regional economic community in 2015 to the benefit 
of itself, the region and the global economy. The external constraints that determines the 
outer boundaries of the room in which the Singaporean state are to operate thus 
depends on its ability to manage its international partners as well as its reputation as a 
high trust society based on a very tightly governed and structured institutional setup. 
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Presumption II 
After having identified the international or external constraints that conditions the 
boundaries of the ‘room’ in which states are to perform we now turn towards the 
societal constraints that determines the internal size of that room. This means that we 
are now to identify the internal factors affecting state performance. Our point of 
departure is thus taken in two other parts of the triangular matrix, namely the role of 
the state and civil society. 
Here we will in particular focus on states’ capability to (re-) direct and/or (re-) design a 
complex inter-ethnic and dynamic societal landscape towards its own interests. This 
means that state performance and the functionality of formal institutions are in a 
constant dialogue with societal agents and their perception of the overall institutional 
set-up, a perception that is motivated by a personal agenda and thus not necessarily in 
agreement with the agendas of the state. Arguably, societal agents thus have the 
capability of changing or at least critically impacting on the functionality of the room for 
state manoeuvring thus increasing or decreasing the size of that room.17 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 The following are mainly from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s country reports on Myanmar, Vietnam and 
Singapore from 2014. 
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Myanmar - an emerging/BOP market: an internal view 
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the Government in Myanmar to continue the 
process of political liberalisation that began in 2011. There are, however, developments 
within both the political and societal sections that will have a critical impact on 
democratisation process. The first emanates from the political party, the National 
League for Democracy (NLD), which is led by Aung San Suu Kyi. This is a political force 
that the government has to take into account and there is no doubt that it plays a 
prominent political role both now and in the future. The question is, however, how 
prominent this role will be taking into account that it is the military-backed political 
party, Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), that defines the political agenda. 
That the pro-democracy opposition is not a coherent political force can be seen by the 
relatively high level of internal disagreements as the reform process opens up more 
space for political activity. 
The second threat toward the government led democratisation processes is the ethnic 
and religious divisions within the national hinterland that have the capability of 
destabilising the political process. Government policies such as a proposed law to 
protect the majority race and religion, as well as a national census that excluded the 
Muslim Rohingya, have inflamed the situation. As the country’s shift towards democracy 
gives freer rein to decades of build-up religious and racial tensions, further outbreaks of 
sectarian violence are likely. Finally, Myanmar’s prospects for long-term stability and 
democratisation also depend on a successful ethnic reconciliation. 
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Fights between government troops and ethnic-minority rebels have escalated in several 
border regions in 2014. Although the administration claims to be close to finalising a 
comprehensive ceasefire agreement efforts to forge a new framework for relations 
between ethnic minorities and the central government there is still a long way to go. The 
minorities’ basic demand for a federal system of government remains anathema to 
powerful elements within the military. Put together political volatility, ethnic and 
religious tensions and the relationship between the minorities and the central 
government creates a rather fragile scenario of the emergence of a stable institutional 
setup as well as the future perspective for the development of democracy in Myanmar. 
Vietnam - an emerging/transitional market: an internal view 
The ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) will retain a firm grip on power in the 
next five years. Despite the existence of factional splits and recent calls for more political 
pluralism, there is little prospect of major instability within the party. 
The latter has experimented with fostering nationalist sentiment in order to boost its 
own legitimacy, which has led to large-scale anti-China riots in May 2014 thus releasing 
‘people power’ inherent in such nationalist initiatives. Sensing this potential danger the 
government’s latest general policy of discouraging large-scale public anti-China protests 
will remain in force in 2015-2019, especially after the recent riots demonstrated how 
easily such incidents can spiral out of control and thus foster another potential source of 
public opposition towards the government. 
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Furthermore, tensions between the authorities and religious groups such as the Roman 
Catholic Church and ethnic minorities like the Hmong is furthermore simmering beneath 
the surface. Protests over land seizures have the potential of becoming more frequent, 
particularly as a slew of lease agreements are expiring creating uncertainty for millions 
of tenants who operate small holdings. Industrial development will also continue to 
displace large numbers of residents, potentially leading to public protests. Put together 
these developments underlines the tensions between the institutional setup and the 
different types of agency in civil society. 
Singapore - a near developed market: an internal view 
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the centre-right People’s Action Party (PAP) to 
remain in power in 2015 to 2019, after it secured a large majority in the 2011 
parliamentary election. However, the opposition managed to triple its representation in 
2011. Also notable was that the PAP’s share of the popular vote declined compared with 
the 2006 poll, and the since the 2011 election the ruling party has lost two by-election. 
Although this suggests that a segment of the public is growing disillusioned with PAP 
there are unlikely to be any major changes to the electoral system in the near future. 
At the present PAP remains popular with the majority of the population. It has managed 
to deliver rising prosperity throughout its long period in government and its far-sighted 
policies have contributed to the evolution of a largely harmonious multicultural society 
that enjoys a high living standard. Despite these achievements, however, anti-immigrant 
sentiment has been on the rise since 2012. 
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In a move against this development a government initiative, the Fair Consideration 
Framework, requires employers to consider Singaporeans before hiring foreigners and 
scrutiny companies if they are employing a disproportionately low number of 
Singaporean workers. This might help to alleviate anti-immigrant feelings, however, 
given that the unemployment rate averaged just 2% in the first half of 2014, restrictive 
labour practices will affect business efficiency as well as Singapore’s competitiveness 
and reputation for openness. 
Finally, in a sign of increasing popular disenchantment with the government, more than 
2000 people attended a rally in mid-2014 against the alleged lack of transparency in the 
management of the state run pension scheme, the Central Provident Fund. This followed 
three protests against the government in 2013, including two large demonstrations 
against an official white paper projecting that the population would need to expand 
significantly by 2030 mostly through immigration for the government to achieve its 
target rate of economic growth. Further protests are likely as Singaporeans become 
more politically engaged, but these will not destabilise the government. 
Sub-conclusion on Presumption II 
In the above we have shortly discussed the internal or societal constraints that 
determine the size of the room in which states are to perform. Our point of departure in 
this connection has been taken in two other parts of the triangular matrix, namely the 
role of the state and civil society 
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 Here the key issues have been the capability of states to (re-) direct and/or (re-) design 
a complex inter-ethnic and dynamic societal landscape towards its own interests. The 
outcome of this discussion have been that the state is forces by shifting local 
circumstances to engage in a constant dialogue with agents from within the civil society 
and their perception of the whether the overall institutional set-up is conducive to the 
various agendas and discourses found within civil society. Arguably, the main argument 
here has been that it is in the outcome of the dialogue between the state and agents from 
within civil society that the size of the room for state manoeuvring has been carved out 
thus indicating whether it is increasing or decreasing. That depends on the outcome of 
this dialogue. 
As has been shown in the above it is not only the state that sets the agenda for how the 
three cases evolve. Even though the state is a powerful player indeed it still has to 
negotiate its room for manoeuvring with the stakeholders within the national 
hinterland. The state in Myanmar cannot establish an institutional setup in order to 
bolster its perception of a conducive institutional setup without consulting the political 
opposition as well as the different ethnic and religious groups that put together make up 
the actors in the national hinterland. Actually, its room of manoeuvring is curtailed by 
those actors and to increase it, the state has to include them in the overall nation making 
process. 
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 If not the democratisation process and thus national coherence is at stake. In the case of 
Vietnam, due to the authoritative nature of the state and not having the same external 
pressure for initiating a democratisation process as in the case of Myanmar the state has 
nonetheless to be careful about exercising its power as there seems to be a growing 
awareness within civil society that people power ultimately have the capability to rain in 
state initiatives and thus the extend of state performance. That would ultimately limit 
the size of the room in which the state has to perform. 
Finally, Singapore is still capable due to its total political control over civil society to stir 
the city state clear of major negative civil reaction towards this control mode. Tensions 
within civil society, however, are on the rise partly because of the authoritative nature of 
the state thus signalling that citizens is mainly conceived of as passive agents, and partly 
because of the state’s immigration policy. Because of a budding public pressure for more 
public intervention and engagement in state policies as well as a pressure for nurturing 
the specific status of being a Singaporean citizen the state has to move carefully on these 
issues thereby unavoidably limiting the size of its room of manoeuvring in this regard. 
 
On Identifying Key External and Internal Factors Affecting State Performance in 
Southeast Asia: Some Concluding Remarks 
After now having tentatively outlined the factors that constitute the background for 
defining the external boundaries of the ‘room’ as well as the internal size of it in which 
the state in Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore has to act let us now revert to the overall 
theoretical framework for this mode of analysing state performance. 
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The point of departure for employing this framework has been the notion of 
glocalisation. As glocalisation not only deals with economic matters connecting the 
global and national but encompasses all aspects of the local in the national and thus also 
in the global, it is important to look at the main players in this context, which have been 
grouped together in a triangular matrix. As have been discussed above the individual 
points in the matrix consist of 1) global political and economic developments, 2) the role 
of the state in an international cum national context as well as 3) the civil society within 
the individual national hinterland. By analysing the relationships between these three 
main players it becomes possible to identify the drivers behind processes of 
glocalisation and thus address both the boundaries as well as the size of the ‘room’ in 
which states are confined to perform, nationally as well as internationally. 
This perspective amounts to a holistic approach of analysing state performance, as we 
recognise that the three other modes of thinking the global economy—the potentiality of 
de- or recouple from it, whether it is spiky or flat or whether a qualitative market 
differentiation of it is productive—only address two of the three corners in the triangle, 
that is, the global political and economic developments and the role of the state 
nationally and internationally. On the basis of this we began our discussion by looking 
closer at the way in which the state performs in relation to the different corners in the 
triangle so as to be able to identify how sets of external and internal constraints either 
confines or enlarge the ‘room’ in which the state is capable of performing. 
Two main presumptions have been formulated as analytical points of departures. First, 
every nation state constitutes a part of the international community but not every nation 
state has the same impact and international reach. 
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The scope of this depends on the economic and political capabilities that the individual 
state is capable of mustering. The relationship between nation states is thus 
asymmetrical. This was clearly illustrated in the discussion of the external factors that 
affect state performance in our three case countries thus identifying the outer 
boundaries of the room in which the individual state is capable of performing. Second, as 
a state depends on institutional stability for its basic functioning it has to adapt to and at 
the same time manipulate a given institutional set-up to perform in an optimal manner, - 
a setup that is partly conditioned by the type of market in which it is embedded. This 
presumption attempts to identify the size of the room in which it is to perform. The 
actual size of that room dependent on its capability to (re-) direct and/or (re-)design a 
multiple inter-ethnic and dynamic societal landscape towards its own interests, a 
landscape that is heavily influenced by agents from within civil society and how their 
perception of the overall institutional set-up is constructed. This means that state 
performance and the functionality of the institutional setup are in a constant dialogue 
with societal agents, who have the capability to change or at least to impact on the 
functionality of the institutional room for state manoeuvring. This was also clearly 
illustrated in the discussion of the internal factors affecting state performance in our 
three case countries. 
Interestingly, the latter discussion negates the perception of the institutional 
frameworks as having a capability to dictate pre-defined social and political paths for 
agents within the institutional setup. Accordingly, institutional frameworks may 
constrain but also offer new opportunities for agents as they allow for new modes of 
learning what may go beyond the possibilities originally recognised by agents. 
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This creates tensions between the state and the institutional set-up in which it is 
embedded, as the institutional set-up is in a constant state of flux. It is this schism that 
allows us to identify the size of the room for state manoeuvring. 
Arguably, this article thus maintains that the state is sandwiched in terms of 
manoeuvring between external and internal factors. Even though this approach has only 
been applied to Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore it has the capability of being 
employed more generally to Southeast Asian nations. This, however, depends of more 
thorough empirical studies of the individual state than has been presented here. 
 
Michael Jakobsen 
May 2015 
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